



**DEMOCRACY-BUILDING  
IN AFGHANISTAN:  
AN INTEGRATED DIMENSION  
FOR THE WAY FORWARD**

**EUROPEAN UNION  
ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
OF REPORT**

This report was produced by the EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) for the parliamentary and provincial council elections on 18 September 2005 and presents the EU EOM's findings on the challenges of democracy-building in Afghanistan. These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as a statement of the Commission. The European Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report, nor does it accept responsibility for any use made thereof.

## **Main Assumptions**

The EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to Afghanistan believes that democracy can enhance the prospects of sustainable peace in countries, like Afghanistan, emerging from prolonged and brutal conflict. Democratic systems enable political actors to resolve disagreements through debates and other political means rather than by violence and intimidation. A well-functioning and credible democratic system is therefore regarded by the EU EOM as a valuable safeguard against a return to Afghanistan's brutal recent past.

The EU EOM believes that democratisation issues cut across and affect various aspects of the stabilisation and development process in Afghanistan. Democracy-building should therefore be carefully integrated into the different pillars or themes of the Afghan National Development Strategy, which the government is currently preparing. Further, democratisation should be reflected in the post-Bonn 'Compact for Afghanistan' that is expected to be presented at an international conference on Afghanistan to be held in London in early 2006.

Although there is no single universal model of democracy, there are certain widely recognised fundamental principles. The adoption of a Constitution and the various elections held over the course of the Bonn process are very important steps in democratisation. However, they should not be viewed as 'the end of the story'. Successful and sustainable democracy-building during the post-Bonn phase of Afghanistan's transition and stabilisation process will require that a number of additional conditions continue to be met or are met in future.

In terms of political systems and institutions, successful and sustainable democracy-building requires:

- A democratic electoral system
- Well functioning and accountable government institutions
- Rule of law
- Protection of human rights
- 'Checks and balances' to define the respective roles and powers of the main executive, legislative and judicial institutions
- Political pluralism
- A certain degree of decentralisation of government

However, democracy-building should not be regarded only in relation to political systems and institutions. For a successful and sustainable transition to democracy, important changes are also implied in society and civic culture. For Afghanistan, key areas in this regard are:

- Expansion of political participation through a strengthened civil society
- Strengthened role of the media
- Continuing improvement of the situation of women especially in public life
- Enhancement of national unity and reconciliation, and ending a culture of impunity.

Several risk factors threaten to undermine democratic development in Afghanistan. The most critical ones are the following:

- Widespread corruption and lack of good governance
- A pervasive illegal opium production
- Continued lack of security and stability in parts of the country including continued presence of illegal armed groups.

These three risk factors are strongly interlinked. For example, the illegal opium economy funds illegal armed groups and feeds corruption. Insecurity and lack of governance feed off each other and also create conditions where illegal opium cultivation can thrive. The legacy

of more than two decades of conflict has created a climate of scepticism and a limited 'time window' for reform. Continued international engagement in support of security, economic and social development with focus on social cohesion in addition to local empowerment and public participation are important to underpin a solid democracy-building in Afghanistan.

Another significant factor is closing the growing gap between the Afghan people's expectations related to state-building, reconstruction and development and the performance of the government and the international community. This cuts both ways. There are undoubtedly measures that can be taken by the government and the international community to improve the performance of state institutions and the delivery of services to the population. At the same time, in some respects expectations are unrealistic in terms of the speed or extent of positive change. In these areas, political and developmental objectives need to be honestly debated, to prevent the onset of widespread disillusionment that can result in public disengagement from the political process.

## **Assessment of the Bonn Process**

### *Achievements and weaknesses of the Bonn process*

Four years on, the main achievements of the Bonn process can be summarised as:

- A basic foundation for state structures was laid down (including adoption of a new constitution and a broad roadmap for elections).
- The elections went peacefully which in itself was a significant achievement.
- Relative stability was achieved through inclusion and bargaining with local power brokers.
- Partial demilitarisation through the dissolution of armed structures.
- Centralisation to weaken powerful non-statutory power brokers.
- Establishment of national leadership and election of parliament.

The main weaknesses of the Bonn process are assessed as follows:

- Lack of a broader vision for state-building and development on key issues such as the relation between central and local government, public sector reform, rule of law, etc.
- Civic education limited mostly to the mechanics of elections rather than to broader aspects of democracy-building such as national unity, rule of law, public ownership of the Constitution or the rights and duties of government and citizens.
- Limited international assistance on security has been an impediment to broad political participation and to development outreach in certain parts of the country, particularly in the South and East; moreover, the Bonn process could have included the regional aspects of national stability.
- Lack of time to pursue reconciliation and to develop political trust and national unity, *inter alia* by tackling impunity.
- During the initial part of the Bonn process, inadequate commitment and attention by the international community and the government to handling illegal opium production. Although the level of commitment and attention has increased since mid-2004, the extent of the problem has also grown significantly in the meantime.

The basic foundations of democracy have been laid down as a result of the Bonn process. However, in order to consolidate and deepen democracy in Afghanistan, a comprehensive strategy for broad political development is now needed. This should take account of the wider political context including factionalism; the co-existence of ethnic groups; extremism and religious fundamentalism; the organisation of the state (in particular, decentralisation and relations between the centre and the regions); relations between the state and its citizens; human rights (with a particular emphasis on women's and children's rights); transitional

justice, strengthening of civil society; the role of media and freedom of speech; illegal drug production and security.

## **Democracy in Afghanistan**

### *How fast should democracy be built?*

There are different views on the advantages and adverse effects of fast democratisation processes. Democracy reduces the risk of conflict and strengthens peace-building. Yet over-hasty or poorly managed transformations may increase the risk of conflicts re-erupting and a risk of undermining long-term democratisation prospects, especially if broader public participation is neglected. Democracy in Afghanistan should be developed in a form that is suitable to the country's culture, political maturity and level of stability. Democracy should build on existing assets and structures, but not compromise fundamental principles of equal public participation, people-led decisions, freedom of speech, and right to form political associations.

### *Democracy and Islam*

The facile assumption that Islam and democracy do not mix is deeply flawed. The major obstacles to democratisation are not religion but backwardness, poverty, ignorance, and traditions that conflict with the notion of respect for human rights. An Islamic society may very well be based on freedom of thought and expression as well as equality and the rule of law.

## **Democracy and State-Building - the Two Sides of the Same Coin**

Democratisation and state-building are clearly inter-linked processes. The state of Afghanistan is the guarantor of the rule of law, the protector of human rights and is fundamental for promoting democratisation. Democracy can contribute to state-building by helping to improve consistency of government acts, delivery of public services, protection of human rights and security. A representative democracy will increase the trust of the people regarding their elected (and presumably representative) political leaders' performance. Democratic processes can ensure oversight and accountability especially of the security sector, which has the greatest potential to abuse governance processes

### *Challenges for future democratic elections in Afghanistan*

Afghanistan has gained experience in holding elections based on universal suffrage. These have been remarkable endeavours that unfolded relatively peacefully and in a short time. Universal suffrage is important but it is not necessarily enough to ensure democracy and equal opportunities to influence or participate in government. A range of issues will influence people's opportunities for electoral participation and elected representation.

The Joint Electoral Management body in collaboration with the UN and the government initiated in May 2005 a working group to develop a strategy for holding future elections. The work of this 'Post-Election Strategy Group' (PESG) comprises capacity needs, cycles of elections in regard to political outcomes and economic sustainability, and funding requirements. In addition to the work of the PESG, political parties, civic education, trained national election observers, and relations to civil society are relevant for the holding of successful future elections.

The constitution of Afghanistan guarantees party and political pluralism. Political parties were represented in the parliamentary elections only as accredited observers. Afghanistan currently has more than 70 parties. Political reform, greater convergence and coalition building are needed. Political parties need to be representative, democratic and in touch with public opinion in order to gain credibility and build confidence from the government, people and civil society. There is a strong link between a parliament's legislative ability and the maturity of political parties.

The establishment of resource centres at provincial level could provide useful facilities to political parties. The widespread public scepticism or resentment towards political parties is not conducive to sustainable long-term democracy-building in Afghanistan and therefore needs to be turned around through training of young political leaders and civic education.

Civic education has been part of the election process but has concentrated on the electoral procedures. Nationwide and continued civic education on democratic relations between state and citizen should have a high priority in the Post-Bonn era.

#### *Women in politics – not yet there*

Experience shows that legislation is not enough when it comes to improving the role of women in the political process. However, given continuing limitations on opportunities for women in Afghan society, quotas for women should be retained until they are in a position to claim their political rights on an equal footing with men.

It is necessary/desirable to build on the momentum of elected women in parliament and support a female caucus. Training in policy-making, legal review, and public speaking (as many women are unfamiliar with speaking in large official fora) should be provided to enhance the impact of women on decision-making. Gender mainstreaming training should also be provided for all MPs.

#### *A functional parliament*

The national assembly is empowered to provide oversight of the executive and cabinet, and may also summon ministers to demand accountability. It is also mandated to adopt new legislation; to review, ratify or modify draft and existing laws and international treaties; and to approve the state budget. Four important aspects for democracy-building in Afghanistan are:

- Training and capacity building of parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, with the immediate priority on legal drafting and budget reviewing
- Rules of procedure for parliament and a code of ethics
- Accountability and transparency of the National Assembly itself
- Formalisation of the relationship between the parliament, the executive, the government and provincial councils in regard to policy- and law-making

#### *Strengthened local administration for effective government outreach*

Afghanistan has a long tradition of strong decentralised local administration in the form of tribalism and warlordism. The central state has had to negotiate the support of local leaders to stay in power throughout its history. The Bonn process emphasised centralisation. But a decentralised local administration is also an important element of democratisation as it can harness the link between the state and its citizens, improve state-building and provide better responses to local needs. There is an inherent dilemma between maintaining peace, stability and building a central state on the one hand, and promoting democratisation, local empowerment and political pluralism on the other hand.

There is a great need for clarity on the interaction, mandates and structures of the various local administration bodies and initiatives. These comprise at provincial level the newly elected Provincial Councils, the centrally-appointed provincial governors and the Provincial Development Councils, in addition to the structures established by national government programmes such as the Afghan Stabilisation Programme (ASP) and the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Another factor to be taken into account is how best to bridge traditional institutions with these new structures, as there is no reference to traditional local administration such as *shura*, *jirgas* and *maleks* (village leaders) in the constitution, in legislation, or in policies or programmes except in the NSP.

A comprehensive vision for the next phase of state-building is required. This should address the proposed structure of government and the division of responsibilities between the national, provincial and district levels.

Development aid should, where possible, be devolved and not only centralised. A national strategy for capacity-building for central and local administration needs to be coupled immediately to the reform of the Ministry of Interior - with clear targets, performance measures for transfer of knowledge and skills.

## **Rule of Law**

### *A reformed and trustworthy judiciary*

Justice, peace and democracy are mutually reinforcing imperatives. Rule of law is essential for the peaceful resolution of disputes and should replace arbitrary non-statutory adjudication and violence. Rule of law and reform of the judiciary have not experienced sufficient progress, despite supposedly being a priority of 'Bonn'. It is probably the most complicated sector because of the co-existence in Afghanistan of different sources of law (statutory law consisting of different civil codes from different regimes; customary law; Islamic law; and international human rights law). In the absence of a functioning court system, access to justice is currently inadequate, especially for women.

Legal reform is urgently needed to develop a comprehensive and coherent body of national legislation, but reconstruction and capacity-building are also high priorities. The thousands of presidential orders and decrees need to be reconciled with future law-making to avoid legal conflicts and the creation of unwanted precedents. Interim legislation such as the criminal procedure and juvenile justice codes should have a defined duration. Law reform should be closely coordinated with the security sector and police reform to ensure complementarity, synergy and better-balanced funding allocation. (Of the national development budget, the justice sector has received 2.6% of total contributions to security and law enforcement.)

Further development of the "Justice for All" proposal is needed to better address the key problem of overlapping roles between the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General; to harmonise the different sources of law; and to define a hierarchical order. The rebuilding and reform of the judiciary should be closely coordinated with the reform of the security sector and enforcement of counter-narcotics.

### *Human rights – not only the responsibility of the human rights commission*

The Bonn process placed human rights on the nation- and state-building agenda. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission has the lead in promoting protection of human rights. The Commission has established regional offices and pursued programmes to promote

human rights through awareness-raising and to assess the need for accountability for past crimes committed during the war.

The human rights situation has improved in part because of enhanced security provided by the Afghan security forces, ISAF, the Coalition Forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Other factors include increased monitoring and reporting, and the international presence in general. Yet there is still a long way to go. Investigation of abuses and enforcement of corrective or protective measures have limited impact, when both the judiciary and the police are relatively weak in terms of capacity and integrity. Local non-statutory power-brokers, who exercise effective control over many communities, are a major obstacle to improving the human rights situation. The implications of some customary practices need further research and a strategy should be devised to end their negative impacts on human rights, in particular women and children's rights.

The development of a comprehensive action plan to mainstream national human rights should be considered. The Action Plan should include key targets and indicators for human rights mainstreaming and should identify implementing partners including the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.

*Improvement of law enforcement through a better and professional police*

A safe and secure Afghanistan and enforcement of the rule of law require a fully professional police. The German, US and Norwegian police projects have trained more than 35,000 policemen. The goal is 62,000 by the end of 2005. It is ambitious and the concern for quantity and speed may compromise the quality and impact of the training. For ensuring security and the rule of law within Afghanistan, the Afghan National Police (ANP) is not less important than the Afghan National Army (ANA), which has so far received the lion's share of resources from international donors and the state budget. It is vitally important that an increased level of attention should be paid to the development of the ANP, including an effective border police, and the roles and responsibilities of the ANP and the ANA should be clarified. Training should be actively expanded beyond Kabul and major cities through police advisors deployed to the PRTs, mobile training teams, management training, and the working relationship between the judiciary and police should be institutionalised.

*Reform of the Ministry of Interior - an end to overstretch*

The administration of the police falls under the Ministry of Interior (MoI), which is in charge of border control, counter-narcotics police and also sub-national administration. Profound reform of the MoI is required, as its limited absorption capacity is an obstacle to progress. Interim measures to compensate for capacity gaps could include separation of different functions from the ministry to be managed by specific police- or local administration programmes.

## **Fostering Civic Culture**

*The multiple role of the media*

The media has great potential to act as an instrument in peace-building, transition and democratisation. In general, conditions for the media in Afghanistan and the rights of journalists have improved. A vibrant media scene with dozens of independent newspapers and radio stations, as well as a small number of independent TV stations, has emerged. But apparent violations of due process have continued, for example over accusations of blasphemy. The media plays an important role in informing people and shaping their attitudes towards their system of government. It can foster a culture of political pluralism and

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*Democracy-Building in Afghanistan: An Integrated Dimension for the Way Forward*  
*Executive Summary of Report*

of equal representation in spite of gender, ethnicity, religious conviction, lineage, occupation or place of residence. A professional and empowered media can strengthen a culture of accountability by monitoring government performance and private-sector transactions and by disclosing cases of corruption and waste. It may be conducive to restoring cultural identity and heritage that have been damaged during times of war.

Assistance to the media should be based on three pillars of development: investment in legal reform, institutional development and human resources. All three should be considered of equal importance.

*Improvement of the conditions for women – also a man’s job*

In general, it was a priority for the international community to improve the conditions of women after having received reports for years on their maltreatment, particular during the Taliban regime. Nevertheless, very few donors and international organisations have ensured integrated gender mainstreaming in their wider development programmes. Gender advisors should be recruited to the civil service commission to ensure gender-sensitive appointments and also to undertake gender-mainstreaming training of both men and women. It is recommended to ‘professionalise’ gender advisors as an official civil servant position in ministries, policy and national development planning.

Women should have a greater role in local administration by enhancing their engagement in local development. To this end, applied training should be provided. There should be more emphasis on women and men sharing common ground through community-based development projects, and development planning to create a basis for gradual and sustainable changes to exclusion, suppression and segregation.

*Civil society*

Strengthening of civil society may support state-building in Afghanistan through increased and expanded relations between the state and its citizens. Stronger civil society can also increase accountability by leading to broader-based pressure on government institutions to perform effectively. The engagement of civil society in the Afghan political process may foster a culture of political pluralism, dialogue and autonomous political and social space. A strong civil society can enhance the social and political influence of otherwise under-represented groups (such as the poor), increasing their effectiveness in influencing governance institutions and making the latter more responsive to their needs.

Civil society is, however, often associated with NGOs as implementers of humanitarian and development assistance. International support to civil society leads to organisational structures, and to reporting and accounting requirements, that often run counter to the notion of civil society, grass-root level and bottom-up approaches.

As regards the religious community, Western donors may be apprehensive about engaging with Islamic institutions, as well as having a lack of knowledge about how to do so. The religious community is also part of traditional civil society as Islam impacts on everyday life and social behaviour. In addition, Shuras and Jirgas (community councils) and customary practices, mainly *Pashtunwali*, operate as informal governance mechanisms at the community level. The role of the traditional civil society should also be debated, clarified and taken into consideration in the post-Bonn state-building process.

Capacity-building and training of civil society activists and leaders should focus on advocacy, networking, policy-making and lobbying, civic education, the role of the media and work with the press. Relevant legislation should be developed to facilitate civil society initiatives and not to be a ‘straitjacket’ for civil society actors.

Technical assistance should be provided to build associations and unions. Trans-national links with relevant partners in other countries - for example with professional associations, young democratic leaders' forum, trade unions and business associations - are recommended.

*Reconciliation, national unity and ending the culture of impunity*

Dealing with past atrocities will be a big challenge in the post-Bonn era. The government of Afghanistan has taken an important [and significant] initiative to consult and prepare for identification of suitable approaches for how to deal with the legacy of conflict and past crimes. According to the Constitution, the President has the authority to make appointments of heads of armed forces, provincial governors and police chiefs. An independent advisory board consisting of government, representatives of the AIHRC, and non-government representatives would be helpful in this respect. Reform of the judiciary is pivotal before any enforceable transitional judicial measures can materialise.

Any process of transitional justice and reconciliation should be carried out in an inclusive and participatory manner and be tailored to the Afghan context. It should be forward-looking and aim to build peace. This argues for a broad-based approach combining truth-seeking, conflict resolution, mediation and possible compensation and judicial measures. Judicial measures should take into account the different sources of applicable legislation (international humanitarian and human rights law, Islamic law, customary law, and statutory law). The process of transitional justice should be participatory and tailored to the Afghan context and should aim to build peace and heal Afghan society.

Vetting of candidates for government senior positions as regards both their human rights record and their qualifications is an immediate place to start. The President's extensive authority to appoint and dismiss state officials should be supported by an independent advisory panel. Performance measures for government employees should be improved and enforced.

**Risk Factors**

*Lack of good governance and prevalent corruption*

Lack of legal infrastructure, rule of law and public oversight are common challenges for weak states but in particular for a post-conflict transitional regime like Afghanistan. There is hardly any documentation on the scope and depth of corruption in Afghanistan except that it is known to penetrate the state administration at different levels. The office of the President has established an anti-corruption unit with UNDP support, but this is at a preliminary stage. The Attorney General's Office remains weak and the general lack of law enforcement allows corrupt practices to persist.

The salary level of civil servants should be competitive and ensure reasonable living standards for a household. Accountability and transparency should be enhanced through the complete disclosure by government of financial resource use, including contract rewards and sub-contracting. A national contract and audit office could be established. Public oversight should be built in a targeted and efficient fashion to include capacity of government entities, regular audits, training of the police and the attorney general's office in investigation, and strengthening of civil society. Legislation should be developed and applied.

*Illegal drug production as a threat to democracy*

Illegal drug production lubricates corruption and violence, including terrorism. There is a legitimate fear that the fledgling democracy in Afghanistan could be undermined by unaccountable narco-interests capturing state institutions to serve their agenda, if the issue of illegal drug production is not rapidly addressed.

In early 2005, the government took steps to persuade local officials and tribal leaders to curb poppy planting in their regions. Counter-narcotics enforcement assistance is driven by pressure for rapid and visible results. It has mainly affected farmers who are the lowest end of the value-added chain. Billions of dollars are being spent on enforcement and alternative livelihoods and agricultural development.

The current drug control strategy pursued by the government of Afghanistan with international support has achieved limited success in 2005. The key question will be whether it can be deepened and sustained in the coming years. Consistency and perseverance over a long period are clearly required to deal with such a deep-rooted and complex problem, whatever approach is chosen. An unbalanced approach focusing exclusively on eradication, enforcement or alternative livelihood programmes seems unlikely to bring sufficient changes in the near future in Afghanistan. It will take several decades - or more - to eliminate illegal opium production.

Given all these considerations and the serious threat which the illegal opium economy poses to stability and democracy in Afghanistan, it is important to have an open debate and to consider different ideas and approaches on their merits including balance between enforcement actions and assistance for rural development; optimal sequencing of different counter-narcotics interventions; licensed production of opium for medical purposes; role of public information campaigns; regional co-operation in the field of counter-narcotics; and addressing growing drug use in Afghanistan. A comprehensive macro-economic assessment is required to assess and provide an understanding of the impact of the illegal revenue generated by illegal poppy cultivation and to evaluate the benefits of alternative strategies. It is important that the illegal revenue is decreased, which will not succeed if farmers are the main focus of counter-narcotic strategies.

Favourable conditions for agricultural production that can replace poppy cultivation should be ensured. Large-scale projects such as big irrigation and power projects need to start to generate sufficient water for agriculture and also to generate attractive jobs for local people and lessen the local dependency of opium revenue. Market access is pivotal for building a productive and economically favourable agriculture sector. The politico-military networks need to be broken and dismantled to end power-locked markets and poppy cultivation. Local administration and law enforcement should be resourced to effectively assist in combating illegal production, and drug eradication should be part of their performance criteria.

*Security – still the highest priority four years after Bonn*

Rebuilding and reform of the security sector is a resource-intensive and time-consuming process. Faced with the continuing challenges of countering the insurgency, dealing with factionalism and ensuring stability, Afghan security institutions will require continued international support for some years. More than 1,000 people died in militancy-linked violence in mainly southern and eastern Afghanistan in 2005. Illegal armed groups currently perceive few incentives to be loyal to state institutions. Another latent issue is the relatively large number of armed personnel employed by private military companies as compared to the ANA and ANP (and relatively higher wage levels).

*External and internal threats*

The insurgency is complicated to address given the difficulties of controlling porous borders and the transnational networks. The regional or global dimension cannot be ignored in the post-Bonn era given illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and people that cross through Afghanistan and given the existence of transnational extremist networks.

The role of the Afghan National Army is viewed primarily as addressing external threats to national security, whereas internal security threats are primarily the responsibility of the Afghan National Police. However, the ANP remains weak and there are concerns in some areas about its professionalism and integrity, including infiltration by illegal armed groups and links to drug trafficking. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) was fast and effective as far as it went. However, many illegal armed groups remain and are opposed to the expansion of the rule of law and democracy into the provinces.

Among the internal threats, the disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG) is seen as separate from the DDR programme instead of as a continuation. The DIAG programme is linking the process to local governance by involving governors and requiring them to produce a list of IAGs at provincial and district level. However, some governors have reportedly not co-operated so far.

Security sector reform (SSR) needs to be coordinated with assistance and strategies for rebuilding the judiciary, human rights and the police. There should be more emphasis on the regional and global aspect of security threats. The Good Neighbourly Relations Declaration of 2002 should be reviewed with a view to establishing an effective monitoring system with representatives from all neighbour countries to better address the regional dimension. Such agreement could be facilitated by a neutral international organisation. In addition SSR should be combined with alternative ways to secure communities. Support for locally decided development projects can play a role, acting as an incentive and means of empowerment and not as only a reward.

It is recommended that the stabilisation troops should have a more active role in addressing the needs for protection of borders and the adverse affects of the illegal opium production. Further, the number of troops could be discussed in regard to the need to secure aid delivery, particularly in the South and South East and Uruzgan, and more PRTs in the central region to enhance and maintain security and order.

*Management of expectations*

A current and additional challenge is the management of people's expectations. After the presidential election in 2004 many people anticipated that their life would change, but the needs are massive and obviously it will take a long time before the level of development has improved significantly nationwide. Disillusionment may give rise to disengagement and suspicion about corruption and waste. Expectations are based primarily on subjective assumptions and are in general rather high, which is not unusual in post-conflict situations.

An honest public debate about political and developmental objectives (and limitations) seems to be required. Wide dissemination and civic education of the post-Bonn Compact for Afghanistan is suggested so the public is aware of the goals and benchmarks, needs and available resources, geographical focus, and time frames. It is recommended to initiate regular (for instance, annual) reporting by government and parliament to the public on progress and any problems that may have delayed results. Large-scale public investment programmes with

focus on job creation and supply of water and power should be prioritised to improve livelihoods and to build stability by ‘satisfaction’.

## **Concluding Remarks and Key Recommendations**

This report aims to address democracy-building as an integrated perspective for the future of Afghanistan. Several areas have been analysed in this regard that could be summarised into a three-pronged approach: institutional development and state-building; fostering of a civic culture; and addressing the main risk factors to democratisation in shorter- and longer-term. The report provides detailed recommendations for each listed topic. The list of key recommendations includes the following proposals:

### *Role of the international community*

As regards relations between the government of Afghanistan and the international community, it is encouraging that the government has the lead in the post-Bonn planning. It should be supported as needed in its endeavour to develop a vision for the organisation and development of the state and the country. It is recommended that concrete benchmarks for state-building, development, economic growth and security should be complemented by measurable indicators for monitoring of progress or setbacks and for efficient targeting of assistance. Aid should be provided on the basis of mutual and binding arrangements between the Afghan government and the international community, to which all partners should be held accountable. The different security agencies should have proper missions and roles with proper institutional arrangements for oversight and co-ordination to avoid institutional frictions that may impact on the progress of building a peaceful and rules-based society.

### *The future democratisation process*

It is important also to define concrete goals and indicators for the democratisation process using an integrated approach. An Independent Democratisation Monitoring Unit could be created to make periodic comprehensive reviews and serve as an advisory body on democratisation to the government. This Unit could have representatives from the government, the UN, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and relevant civil society actors.